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Evaluating the benefits of agricultural credit:
Evidence from India
Sunil Mitra Kumar∗
Abstract
Access to agricultural credit is emphasised in the policies of several developing
countries, backed by the assumption that credit can aid investment and thereby
farmers’ income. Yet it is difficult to evaluate the benefits of agricultural loans
at household level because farmers self-select into taking loans. In this study we
use survey data from five semi-arid states of India to examine the household-level
effects of loans on farm investment and on an index of assets. To account for the
self-selection, we use propensity score matching to compare farmers who do and do
not avail of loans but are otherwise nearly identical, and we do so using a subset
of the data which form a panel, thereby enabling valid before-after inference. We
find that loans lead to positive but very small and statistically insignificant effects
on both outcomes, and interpret this as ambiguous evidence on the benefits of
agricultural credit. While the majority of related literature focuses on the macro-
effects of credit, our analysis shows that the borrower-level benefits of agricultural
credit may be less apparent, and we explain these findings in relation to a recent
literature on an ongoing agrarian decline in India. Our approach also demonstrates
how large-scale survey data can be used to infer causal relations at the micro level.
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1 Introduction
Credit helps economies to run and to grow (Besley, 1995), and its importance for de-
veloping countries is underscored by the fact that the poor often lack access to financial
institutions (Morduch, 1995; Besley and Burgess, 2003). In particular, the agricultural
sector remains a large employer in several developing countries (Awokuse and Xie, 2015),
and farmers usually require credit because of the time lag between purchasing inputs and
receiving returns after harvest (Conning and Udry, 2007). As a result, government poli-
cies have long emphasised better access to agricultural credit as a way to reduce poverty
(Adams, 1971; Von Pischke and Adams, 1980).
In this paper we examine the household-level effects of agricultural bank loans in rural
India using household survey data. Indian government policy has focused on expanding
formal agricultural credit for over half a century (Sriram, 2007). This has been actioned
through targeted lending at subsidized rates (Golait, 2007), compulsory sectoral-lending
targets for banks (Reserve Bank of India, 2014), and expanding the network of rural bank
branches (Burgess and Pande, 2005). As of 2003, nearly half of all farmer households had
outstanding debt, of which nearly two thirds was from banks of various kinds (Government
of India, 2007).
Even so, it is challenging to evaluate the micro-level effects of such credit because farmers
self-select into taking loans. Without suitable data, it is difficult to disentangle the
effects of loans from differences in demand, the use to which the credit is put, and the
fungibility of credit (Meyer, 1990). Randomised experiments can address these problems
of identification, but being unfeasible to implement over long time horizons or at scale,
tend to be restricted to studying micro-finance borrowing (e.g. Pitt and Khandker, 1998;
Banerjee et al., 2015). Alternatively, observational data can be coupled with strong
assumptions to aid identification in a regression-based framework. Carter (1989) and
Feder et al. (1990) use this approach, suggesting a theoretical model to link credit with
agricultural productivity which is then estimated with the data.
We attempt to address these challenges by using matching techniques based on the
propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to compare farmers who avail of loans
with those who do not. We use a subset of the data which constitutes a panel, wherein
the characteristics used to statistically explain loan status are measured a few months
before the outcome variables are. This enables valid before-after inference, avoiding the
potential confounding that might otherwise arise with purely cross-sectional data (Rosen-
baum, 1984). Matching is the preferred method for evaluating large-scale job training
programmes which exhibit the same characteristic of self-selection into treatment, and
usually lack useful exclusion restrictions (Heckman et al., 1997; Sianesi, 2004; Lechner
et al., 2011; Larsson, 2003; Wunsch and Lechner, 2008). Unlike regression, matching
avoids extrapolation, and restricts the analysis to households who have similar – and
ideally identical – characteristics. This minimises the influence of potential unobserv-
ables to the extent that they are correlated with observed characteristics, and we select
the optimal matching algorithm by using quantile-quantile plots to evaluate the resulting
extent of balance.
We focus on farmer households in five semi-arid states of India, and analyse the effects
of credit on two linked outcomes. The first is a binary indicator for investment in farm
enterprise, and the second, as a proxy for household wealth, is an index of consumer
durable assets. The first outcome is thus a direct measure for the use of credit, while the
second is a less direct measure of any resulting changes in household wealth. Our main
finding is that the treatment effects of agricultural loans on both outcomes are positive,
but very small and statistically insignificant. While raw comparisons suggest that farmers
who obtain loans are more likely to invest as well as own more durables at a later date,
this association weakens substantially once the comparisons are undertaken on matched
samples.
This is a negative finding given the policy emphasis on agricultural credit, but it lends
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empirical support to a recent literature pointing towards an agrarian decline. This decline
is thought to be linked to factors including low output and high input prices, limited access
to markets, limited irrigation facilities, and decreasing state investment in agriculture
(Mishra, 2008; Reddy and Mishra, 2009; Vakulabharanam and Motiram, 2011), but also
to indebtedness, which in extreme cases has contributed to farmer suicides (Government of
India, 2007; Vaidyanathan, 2006). While the majority of the literature focuses on macro-
effects of credit, our analysis thus shows that the borrower-level benefits of agricultural
credit might be more uncertain. Our approach also demonstrates how large-scale survey
data can be used to infer causal relations at the micro level.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the causal mecha-
nism linking access to credit with agricultural incomes, introduces the outcomes we focus
on, and describes the estimation methodology, while section 3 introduces the data. Sec-
tion 4 presents our main results, and section 5 examines their sensitivity to changes in
the matching process. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 From credit to income
The role that credit plays in agricultural production and thereby the incomes of farmer
households can be hypothesised in terms of the following steps.
a) obtaining a loan.
b) investing the loan in agricultural inputs and undertaking agricultural
production. Besides the availability of agricultural inputs, this process
would be influenced by the farmer’s abilities, and the amount and quality
of land owned by the household.
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c) selling the harvest to obtain earnings, which would depend in part on
the availability of markets, transport and storage facilities.
d) using these earnings for one or more of i) paying back the loan, ii) cur-
rent consumption, iii) adding to savings. In adverse circumstances, the
household might borrow yet more or sell existing assets to fund (i) and
(ii).
The effects of agricultural loans could manifest in two ways: they could aid step (b), and
they could increase household wealth levels through step (d).
By focusing exclusively on the role of agricultural loans, any corresponding causal effects
will be averages over unmodeled heterogeneity. For instance, credit and savings are
fungible, so that certain farmers might not borrow at all. Likewise in step (d), even with
the same earnings from a harvest, some farmers will save more while others might consume
more. In common with data from several developing countries, we do not directly observe
household income or earnings from agriculture. Instead, we have information on the
household’s ownership of a number of consumer durable assets, and on any investments
undertaken in agricultural business enterprise.
Our estimations therefore focus on two related outcomes. The first is a binary indicator
of investment in farm enterprise, corresponding to step (b) above. This includes improve-
ments to land and irrigation, the purchase or maintenance of machinery, and land or
buildings. The second outcome is an index of consumer durables, since these are known
to proxy households’ wealth and income in the absence of direct information on income
(Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). Following Kolenikov and Angeles (2009), we estimate this
index using polychoric principal components analysis as detailed in appendix A. Again,
since farmers would spend only part of their income on consumption, and in particular on
the purchase of consumer durables, our estimates based on the ownership of these assets
are averages over this unmodelled (and unobserved) heterogeneity.
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2.2 Treatment effects
Our aim is to estimate the impact of bank loans on indicators of wealth and investments
in farm enterprise. Using the Rubin causal framework (Rubin, 1974), a standard rep-
resentation of this causal inference problem is as follows (see for instance Todd et al.
(2008)). Let T denote treatment status with T = 1 if the household has an agricultural
bank loan and 0 otherwise, and Y1 denote the value of some outcome Y if the household
had a loan and Y0 if it did not. For a given household, the difference in outcome due to
having a loan is Y1−Y0, where only one of Y1 and Y0 is observed, depending on treatment
status. We focus on the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT):
θ = E(Y1 − Y0|T = 1)
Therefore, the aim of our empirical strategy is to construct the counterfactual outcome
Y0 for treatment households. For identification of the ATT, we require one part of the
‘strongly ignorable treatment’ assumption (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), namely, that
the distribution of the counterfactual outcome Y0 is independent of treatment status
conditional on a vector of covariates X (where the more general assumption of Y1, Y0 ⊥
T |X would be required if our aim were to estimate the average treatment effect):
Y0 ⊥ T |X (1)
From this, it follows that E(Y0|T = 1,X) = E(Y0|T = 0,X) = E(Y0|X). To rule out the
presence of treatment units for whom no matching control units can be found a priori,
we also require one part of the ‘common support assumption’, namely that for any given
household, the probability of receiving a loan is strictly less than one:
P (T = 1|X) < 1 (2)
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Given assumptions (1) and (2), we can use a suitable estimator to impute the missing Y0
value for each observed Y1, and use this to estimate the ATT:
θ = E(Y1 − Y0|T = 1,X) = E(Y1|T = 1,X)− E(Y0|T = 1,X) (3)
= E(Y1|T = 1,X)− E(Y0|T = 0,X) (4)
The validity of our analysis crucially rests on the untestable assumption (1). We argue in
support of its validity through our use of a detailed set of covariates, and by subjecting
our results to different sensitivity checks. The covariates used to undertake matching
are explained in detail in section 3.2, and these include indicators of economic status,
human capital, and region fixed effects. Nonetheless, it is possible that certain unobserved
characteristics determine agricultural borrowing and the impact of this credit, such as
motivation, and agricultural knowledge and skill. As partial proxies for these we utilise
information on education levels and age of the household head, and to the extent that
they are reflected in the household’s economic status, they are also partially captured
by the latter set of variables. However we cannot fully rule out the possibility that
these or other unobservables could potentially bias our results. Therefore, we check the
robustness of our results through various sensitivity analyses, both by changing different
parameters of the matching process and by varying the set of covariates used to calculate
the propensity score.
2.3 Matching estimators
Since loans are not distributed at random, the average difference in outcome between
households with loans and those without does not yield an unbiased estimate of the
ATT. A regression-based approach would attempt to adjust for this non-random treat-
ment allocation by controlling for covariates through a linear model, but this involves
extrapolation of the regression function. If the distribution of observed covariates is dif-
6
ferent by treatment group, the same is likely to apply to unobserved or omitted variables
to the extent that they are correlated with observed variables. Treatment effect estimates
would then be biased due to the influence of unobservables on selection into treatment
and potential outcomes. Therefore, matching methods create a sample where all observed
covariates have similar, and ideally identical distributions by treatment group. This min-
imises any corresponding differences in unobservables to the extent that the latter are
correlated with observables.
In other words, matching tries to artificially create an ideal randomised experiment. In
the simplest case, this is implemented by matching each treatment unit with a control
unit that is ideally identical in terms of a vector of covariates X. We follow a ‘dou-
bly robust’ approach (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Robins and Rotnitzky, 1995), and
adjust the simple difference in mean outcome between matched treatment and control
groups for any remaining imbalance in covariates. This is done using weighted regression,
where each outcome variable is regressed on treatment status and the covariates used for
the matching. This yields the treatment effect estimate as coefficient of the treatment
indicator together with the standard error of this estimate.
Given the challenge of identifying matches with a multidimensional set of covariates,
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that matching on X was equivalent to matching on
the propensity score, the probability of a household receiving the treatment conditional
on a vector of covariates X, thus reducing a multidimensional matching problem to a
single dimension. In practice, the true propensity score is not known, and is estimated
using a logit or probit model. An alternative approach is to use the Mahalanobis distance
metric, however we do not use this since it been found to perform worse than propensity
score matching when there are many covariates or these are non-Normally distributed
(Stuart, 2010).
We employ different matching algorithms including 1-to-n matching, kernel, and radius
matching, all based on the propensity score, and choose the best algorithm according
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to the resulting degree of balance across different covariates. To evaluate this degree of
balance, we use summary measures of quantile-quantile plots and standardized bias plots
following the recommendations of Imai et al. (2008); Ho et al. (2007); Stuart (2010) and
Austin (2008).
The standardized bias before and after matching is defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1985) as follows (see, also, the discussion in Lee (2011)):
SBUX =
100(X¯T,U − X¯C,U)√
s2(XT )+s2(XC)
2
(5)
SBMX =
100(X¯T,M − X¯C,M)√
s2(XT )+s2(XC)
2
(6)
Here SBUX (SB
M
X ) is the standardized bias for covariate X in the unmatched (matched)
sample, and respective X¯s refers to the mean of X in groups defined by treatment status
(T, C) and the matched (M) or unmatched (U) sample. s2(XT ) denotes the sample
variance for covariate x in the treatment sample, and s2(XC) the same quantity for the
control sample.
3 Data
We use data from the decadal Debt and Investment Survey carried out by the Indian
National Sample Survey Organisation in 2003 (Round 59, Schedule 18.2). We focus on
the five states classified as semi-arid tropical by the International Crop Research Institute
for the Semi-Arid Tropics, viz. Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra
and Madhya Pradesh (Dinar et al., 1998), and restrict the sample to rural households
who report their main occupation as farming. Data were collected through interviews
at the household level, and questions focused household demographics (including caste,
household size and composition in terms of age and gender, primary occupation, education
8
Figure 1: Timeline of the survey
June 
  
January 
2002 
June December August 
First visit between 
January and August ‘03. 
Collected assets and loan 
data as on survey date 
and also as of June 2002 
Second visit between August and 
December ’03. Collected assets 
and loan data, and also asked 
about agricultural investments 
made between January-June ‘03. 
timeline 
2003 
 
and marital status), land and other assets owned by the household (including consumer
durables and farm equipment), and credit transactions in the recent past.
Credible measurement of treatment effects in an observational study requires that the
covariates controlled for either be measured before treatment was allocated, or be inde-
pendent of treatment status (Cochran and Chambers (1965); see also the discussion in
Rosenbaum (2002)). To this end, an important feature of the survey is that households
were interviewed in two separate visits a few months apart, thus yielding a panel for
a subset of the data. The first visit took place between January and July 2003, and
gathered data on all variables. This includes the consumer durable assets owned by the
household and any outstanding loans as on the date of the survey as well as of June 1,
2002. The second visit took place between August and December 2003, and repeated
questions about households’ ownership of these assets and their borrowings. At this visit
households were also asked whether they had invested in farm enterprise (purchase or up-
grade of land and machinery) during the six months from January to June 2003, without
specifying the exact date of such investments (see figure 1).
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Table 1: Outcomes and definition of treatment
Outcome Treatment definition
Index of consumer durable assets Tassets=1 iff household obtained
owned by household as on date an agricultural loan
of second survey visit during July 2002 - July 2003
Binary indicator for investments Tinvest=1 iff households obtained
in farm enterprise made an agricultural loan
by the household during during July 2002 -December 2002
January 2003 -June 2003
3.1 Definitions and sample restrictions
Our first outcome is an index of consumer durables owned by the household on the date of
the second survey visit, while our second outcome is a binary indicator for investments in
farm enterprise undertaken between January 2003 and June 2003. The index of consumer
durable assets is constructed using polychoric principal components analysis (Kolenikov
and Angeles (2009); also see appendix A).
Our definition of treatment status is based on obtaining loans with the stated purpose of
capital or current expenditure on farm business from a cooperative or commercial bank.
Given the timing at which information on the two outcomes was collected during the
survey, we use two corresponding definitions for treatment status. Focusing on consumer
durable assets, the outcome variable measured on the second survey visit, Tassets=1 for
households who obtained a loan between July 2002 and July 2003 and zero otherwise.
Similarly, since investments in farm enterprise are observed during January 2003 - June
2003, Tinvest=1 for households who obtained a loan during July 2002 - December 2002,
and zero otherwise. These definitions are summarised in table 1.
In order to minimise the confounding influence of previous borrowings we drop households
who had existing loans from informal sources (moneylenders and friends or relatives) in
June 2002 or who obtained them over the course of the two survey visits. Excluding
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these households is a necessary limitation of our analysis, as it is difficult to theorise
how households might put loans from respective sources to different uses, or prioritise
repayments of one loan over another. And in the absence of more detailed information,
it would be difficult to identify the effects of bank loans from those of informal loans.
The same challenge of accounting for previous borrowings also applies to households who
had existing agricultural bank loans in June 2002. Yet unlike borrowings from informal
sources, the terms imposed by existing bank loans would be comparable to those of
new loans, even though we do not have information on how households prioritise existing
repayments over fresh investment. Therefore, we use two separate samples in our analysis.
Our main results are based on the sample of households who did not have any existing
loans as of June 2002, and we present separate estimates for households who already had
an agricultural bank loan in June 2002 as part of the sensitivity analysis.
3.2 Selection of covariates
The covariates used for matching are chosen so as to capture three types of attributes. The
first attribute is the household’s economic status which directly influences the ability to
borrow and make use of credit, and the variables used for this are land area owned, (and as
a proxy for its quality) the value of this land, households’ monthly per capita expenditure,
and two indices for the household’s ownership of a) consumer durable assets in June 2002,
b) farm machinery in June 2002 (details of these indices are provided appendices A and
B respectively). In particular, land ownership is known to be an important determinant
of access to credit since land is used as collateral (Pal, 2002; Swain, 2007).
The second attribute we seek to capture is skill and experience, both of which are not
directly observable but are likely important influences on agricultural production. We use
the household head’s age and years of education as proxies for these. The third attribute
is demographic information to capture the availability of labour within the household,
11
and the age-gender composition which would influence how any change in agricultural
income is reflected in changes in consumer durables’ ownership. The variables used are
household size, sex of the household head, the proportion of children, adult males and
adult females, and a dummy for whether a married adult son lives in the household.
Finally, we use dummies for the state in which the household resides to capture inter-
state differences due to climate, market conditions, and potential unobservables. We
also control for household caste-group, known to be an important determinant of social
capital and economic status in India (Deshpande, 2001) and a significant determinant of
access to credit (Kumar, 2013). This take on four values: Scheduled Tribes (ST) who
are technically not part of the caste-system but have the lowest socio-economic status
amongst the four groups, Scheduled Castes (SC) who are the lowest in the caste hierarchy,
Other Backward Classes (OBC) who are of middling disadvantage, and Others, the high
castes.
3.3 Summary statistics
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the outcome variables and covariates by treat-
ment status. The assets index outcome variable has significantly higher levels in treat-
ment households compared to control households (p=0.000 using a two-sample t-test),
and the farm investment outcome has a significantly higher proportion among treatment
households (p=0.001 using Pearson’s chi-squared test).
Table 2 shows that on average, all households own quite little land. That said, respective
groups of treatment households own more land compared to control households, and this
trend holds across most correlates of economic status. Similarly, treatment households
are more likely to have a male head of the household, to have a (resident) married male
child, and to have a higher proportion of adults in the family. As we now discuss, the
levels of some of these covariates are also statistically significant predictors of treatment
12
status.
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4 Results
4.1 Estimating the propensity score
Table 3 shows the estimation results from probit models, where the dependent variables
are, respectively, the twin treatment status binary variables. The signs of most covariates
reflect the pattern of raw differences in table 2. Of these, the value of land owned is
a statistically significant positive predictor of treatment status, as is the level of the
assets index in June 2002 and the proportion of adult males in the family. Besides,
there are significant inter-state differences in the proportion of households receiving loans.
Household caste categories are not statistically significant predictors of treatment status.
However, the coefficients themselves reflect known patterns of access to credit (Pal, 2002,
e.g.), where, with scheduled tribes (STs) as the base, higher caste ‘Others’ are more likely
to have a loan, and scheduled castes (SCs, the lowest in the caste hierarchy) are least
likely to have a loan.
We use these estimated coefficients to predict the respective probabilities of treatment,
i.e. the propensity score. Figure 2 shows the distributions of these estimated propensity
scores, and establishes that there is substantial overlap in the distribution for treatment
and control groups.
4.2 Matching
We use nearest-neighbour matching (n=1 to 10) and kernel matching. Nearest neighbour
matching is undertaken with replacement, since this allows good matches to be used
multiple times thereby reducing bias (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002), and we also impose a
caliper equal to one quarter of a standard deviation of the propensity score to prevent
dissimilar matches. The same quantity is used as the bandwidth for performing kernel
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Figure 2: Distribution of propensity scores by treatment status
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Table 3: Estimation of propensity score
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Variable Tassets Tinvest
(log) Land area owned 0.100∗∗ (0.0403) 0.0570 (0.0428)
(log) Value of land owned 0.0886∗∗ (0.0388) 0.120∗∗∗ (0.0414)
Assets index June 2002 -0.00731 (0.0259) -0.0395 (0.0277)
Farm machinery index June 2002 0.222∗∗∗ (0.0472) 0.205∗∗∗ (0.0495)
(log) Household monthly per capita expenditure 0.0635 (0.0847) 0.0713 (0.0899)
Residential area owned -0.0639 (0.489) -0.0448 (0.509)
Years of education household head 0.00600 (0.00549) 0.00593 (0.00587)
Age of household head 0.00451 (0.00292) 0.00448 (0.00310)
Male household head 0.199∗ (0.119) 0.0901 (0.124)
Household has married male child 0.0802 (0.0840) 0.121 (0.0886)
Household proportion of children 0.251 (0.192) 0.193 (0.204)
Household proportion of adult males 0.471∗∗ (0.208) 0.531∗∗ (0.221)
Household proportion of adult females 0.107 (0.193) 0.142 (0.206)
Household size 0.0180 (0.0148) 0.0201 (0.0155)
Household caste group
Scheduled Tribe (base) (base)
Scheduled Caste -0.128 (0.115) -0.0777 (0.121)
Other Backward Classes -0.00348 (0.0935) 0.00248 (0.0989)
Others 0.0650 (0.103) 0.0281 (0.109)
State
Andhra Pradesh (base) (base)
Karnataka -0.403∗∗∗ (0.0998) -0.434∗∗∗ (0.107)
Madhya Pradesh -0.466∗∗∗ (0.0847) -0.361∗∗∗ (0.0885)
Maharashtra -0.285∗∗∗ (0.0827) -0.321∗∗∗ (0.0883)
Tamil Nadu -0.270∗∗ (0.108) -0.366∗∗∗ (0.117)
Constant -2.834∗∗∗ (0.642) -3.354∗∗∗ (0.682)
Number of observations 3314 3314
Log likelihood -1405.2 -1213.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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matching using an Epanechnikov kernel.
A central question surrounding matching methods is on the selection of the optimal
matching algorithm. Since the aim of matching is to artificially recreate an ideal ran-
domized experiment, this translates into creating a matched set with identical joint dis-
tributions across all covariates, and the extent of balance that actually results from the
matching ought to be used as the criterion for choosing the optimal algorithm. Since it
is difficult to compare multi-dimensional joint distributions, a compromise is to consider
pair-wise distributions by treatment status for each covariate. (Imai et al., 2008) argue
why these comparisons should be based not on statistical tests but on quantile-quantile
plots (which are independent of sample size) and comparisons of standardised bias (also
see Stuart (2010); Ho et al. (2007)).
We follow this approach, and focus on quantile-quantile plots for five covariates that are
important determinants of access to and the use of credit: the (log) value of land owned,
the total area of land owned, the index of consumer durable assets on the baseline date
(June 2002), household monthly per capita expenditure, and years of education of the
household head.
In order to construct the quantile-quantile plots, matched sets of treatment and control
observations must be constructed after taking into account the weights obtained from the
matching process (Joffe et al., 2004). We do this by expanding the matched dataset such
that the number of times a given observation is replicated is proportional to the weights
placed on it by the matching process. And, we summarise these quantile-quantile plots in
terms of the percentage reduction in mean deviation for unmatched relative to matched
samples from the 45◦ line of perfect symmetry. Table 4 shows these results for respective
matching algorithms.
For both outcome variables and their corresponding definitions of treatment, kernel
matching results in the least decrease in imbalance. Among the 1-n algorithms, matching
18
on three or more nearest neighbours results in a 90% or greater decline in imbalance
for most covariates, with the exception of years of education of the household head. In
addition, figure 3 shows box plots of the standardized bias across all continuous variables
used in the propensity score estimation for each matching algorithm. Unlike table 4, this
metric focuses only on the difference in means and not the overall distribution, and so is
arguably a less useful metric to evaluate balance. In contrast to table 4, these plots sug-
gest that kernel matching performs best, with no obvious pattern for nearest-neighbour
matching. Taken together with 4, this suggests that kernel matching helps reduce the
imbalance in means, but not in the overall distribution of respective variables.
Since we prioritise reductions in imbalance across the overall distributions, we select 1-3
matching for the assets index outcome and 1-8 matching for the farm investment outcome.
These algorithms result in the highest reduction in imbalance for years of education, and
achieve at least a 90% reduction in imbalance for the remaining four covariates in table
4.
4.3 The impact of loans
Table 5 shows the estimated treatment effects. These are calculated using weighted
regression such that treatment and control units are almost identical in terms of back-
ground covariates (Ho et al., 2007). Matching with the selected 1-n algorithm yields a set
of weights, where each matched treatment observation has weight one, and each control
observation has weight equal to the number of times it is used as a match, normalised
by n. These matching weights are then multiplied with the survey probability weights,
and the quantities thus obtained are used as weights for the regression in order that the
treatment effect estimate is representative for the survey population.
For both investments in the farm enterprise and the index of durable assets owned by
the household, the treatment effects are positive but statistically insignificant. Notwith-
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Figure 3: Standardised bias plots
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Table 5: Treatment effects for assets and farm investment
θ Standard p-value
error
Assets index 0.0491 0.0319 0.1241
Farm investment 0.0198 0.0151 0.1902
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standing debates on statistical significance (e.g. McCloskey & Ziliak 1996), the absolute
magnitude of the treatment effect for the assets index is also small, corresponding to less
than 0.04 of a standard deviation. The treatment effect is larger for the farm investment
outcome (0.019 compared to the sample proportion of 0.023), but the accompanying
p-value is also large (p=0.19). Compared to the raw differences in table 2, the matching-
adjusted differences are thus both smaller in absolute value and statistically insignificant.
In other words, we do not find evidence that obtaining an agricultural loan makes it more
likely that households will invest in farm enterprise once we account for other attributes,
and nor do such loans lead to higher levels of assets ownership.
While these results suggest a negative answer to the overall question this paper seeks to
address – whether agricultural credit is useful – the results for the two outcomes have
distinct but related implications. As a measure of the overall impact of agricultural
borrowing (and the culmination of steps (a)-(d) outlined in section 2), the assets index
outcome is arguably the more significant in an economic sense. Yet this metric is also
likely insensitive to small changes in income, especially over a relatively short period of
approximately one year, as in this data. Alternatively, it could also be the case that the
‘true’ treatment effect is zero, with only some households benefiting and others incurring
losses due to (here unobserved) shocks. Unfortunately the current data do not enable us
to differentiate between these scenarios.
There is less ambiguity, however, regarding the second outcome variable, since invest-
ments in agricultural enterprise (step (b) in section 2) are a necessary component of the
production process. Since the timing of successive observations in the data are suit-
able for observing agricultural borrowing and subsequent investments, our finding of an
insignificant treatment effect is less likely to be a limitation of the data and empirical
approach, and more likely evidence of the unobserved variations in the use of agricultural
credit (e.g. for consumption instead of investment). While we cannot directly observe
such variations in the data at hand, overall our results support the mixed evidence sur-
22
rounding financial access and indebtedness due to which the net effect of agricultural
credit remains ambiguous Vakulabharanam and Motiram (2011); Vaidyanathan (2006).
We discuss this issue further in section 6, and before that, examine the sensitivity of our
results.
5 Sensitivity analysis
We now discuss the sensitivity of our results to changes in the matching process and the
selection of covariates used in the analysis. Table 6 shows respective treatment effects
corresponding to changes in parameters of the selected matching algorithms. Part (a)
shows the changes in treatment effects if we drop observations in the thinnest 5% and
10% of the distribution of the propensity score. Doing so excludes observations that are
outliers in terms of the propensity score, though we would not expect such trimming to
change the quality of matches because the use of calipers would in any case exclude poor
matches. The results show that the estimated treatment effect(s) remain largely the same
even if observations on the relatively thin parts of the propensity score distribution are
excluded.
Part (b) of table 6 shows the effects of varying the calipers used for matching to exclude
poor matches. The first row corresponds to table 5, where the caliper is set to one quarter
of a standard deviation of the estimated propensity score, while rows 2 and 3 use smaller
calipers of, respectively, 0.10 and 0.05 of a standard deviation. Since calipers define the
maximum permissible difference in propensity scores of any two matched observations,
smaller calipers would improve the quality of matches. Correspondingly, the number of
unmatched observations also increases. The results show that treatment effects are largely
insensitive to the change in calipers, and that even with more exacting matching criteria,
the treatment effects for both outcomes remain small and statistically insignificant.
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Table 7: Sensitivity to use of survey weights and selection of covariates
Assets index Farm investment
θ Standard p-value θ Standard p-value
error error
Excluding survey weights 0.0295 0.0221 0.1824 0.0162 0.0116 0.1642
Excluding age and education -0.0046 0.0265 0.8610 0.0245 0.0146 0.0924
Excluding economic status covariatesa 0.3395 0.0948 0.0003 0.0355 0.0134 0.0083
Excluding household demographicsb 0.0286 0.0244 0.2427 0.0244 0.0149 0.1019
a Value and area of land owned, household monthly per capita expenditure, farm machinery index,
assets index June 2002, and the residential land area owned.
b Sex of the household head, a binary indicator for a married son living with the family,
household proportions of children, adult males and adult females, and household size.
Next we examine how the results presented in table 5 are sensitive to the use of survey
weights and the exclusion of three categories of covariates in the propensity score esti-
mation: ability and experience, economic status, and household demographics. Table 7
shows that our results are invariant to the exclusion of survey weights in that the results
remain statistically insignificant. However, both the absolute magnitude of treatment
effect as well as statistical significance change substantially according to the choice of co-
variates used to undertake the matching. That is, excluding indicators of economic status
yields a much larger, positive, and statistically significant treatment effect for both out-
come variables (p<0.01). This is not surprising, as we would expect households’ existing
economic status to predict not only access to credit, but also subsequent wealth as cap-
tured by the assets index outcome. Excluding these variables from the matching process
would then lead to differences in the assets outcome being correlated with treatment
status.
Finally, we also calculate treatment effects for households who already had bank loans
as of June 2002. For these households, the respective treatment definitions of Tassets and
Tfarm are according to whether they obtained a new loan in the corresponding periods
under study as described in table 1. There are 998 such households in the sample, and
appendix C provides summary statistics, results for estimation of the propensity score(s)
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Table 8: Sample of households with existing bank loans in June 2002
θ Standard p-value
error
Assets index -0.0741 0.0664 0.2651
Farm investment 0.0070 0.0175 0.6894
and selection of the optimal matching algorithm for this sample. The treatment effect
estimates for this sample are given in table 8, which shows that there is no statistically
significant evidence of a treatment effect on either outcome. In fact, the treatment effect
for the assets index of negative here (with a large p-value), and the proportional change
in farm investment is much smaller in absolute magnitude (0.0070 vs 0.019) compared
to the results in table 5 (again, with a large p-value). Thus, the main result remains
qualitatively unchanged for this sample as well, demonstrating that additional loans too
do not have a statistically significant influence on farm investments or assets.
6 Discussion
We have attempted to measure how obtaining agricultural credit influences subsequent
investments in farm enterprise and an assets index for farmer households in the semi-
arid states of India. We define treatment status according to whether the household
obtained a new agricultural loan in the approximately year-long period under study, and
use propensity score matching to estimate treatment effects, selecting the best matching
algorithm according to the corresponding extent of balance. In order to minimise the
effects of unobservable differences between households as a result of pre-existing borrow-
ings, our main results are based on a subset of households who did not have any existing
loans. As a sensitivity check, we also present results for households who already had bank
loans, some of whom went on to borrow a fresh loan.
Our results are largely negative when viewed in the context of policies that emphasise
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agricultural credit as key to increasing rural incomes. That is, we find limited evidence
that obtaining credit increases the probability of investing in agricultural production or
results in higher values of a wealth index, and this evidence is statistically insignificant.
Further, these results are robust to various sensitivity checks such as changes in the
matching algorithm, the inclusion of survey weights, and the use of regression adjustment.
In other words, since we have focused on average treatment effects for the treated, we
find no significant evidence that households who availed of agricultural bank credit would
have fared worse had they not done so, both in terms of investments in agriculture as
well as increases in an assets index.
While these findings appear to undermine some of the main assumptions behind govern-
ment policies for rural financial inclusion in India, our analysis also has certain important
limitations. The primary limitation stems from the nature of data available, in that the
period of time over which we can observe the same household and any changes in the
situation thereof is approximately one year. The earliest data for loans and assets are
for June 2002, which households are asked to list retrospectively at the first survey visit
in 2003, while the latest data are from the second survey visit in late 2003 (as figure 1
details). Arguably, a one-year period might limit the extent to which changes in economic
status or incomes can manifest, which then limits any analysis into causal links between
these and agricultural loans.
Multiple observations from the same households over a longer period of time would also
enable more detailed analysis that allows for multiple borrowings from different sources,
for instance, to examine how households fare when borrowing from both informal and
formal sources. In the absence of such data it is difficult to argue for the valid identifi-
cation of treatment effects given potentially unobservable heterogeneity in existing loans
and commitments on these at any one point in time. To avoid this problem, the main
part of our analysis has focused on households without existing loans, who therefore rep-
resent only a subset – albeit a significant one – of farmers as a whole. Furthermore, in
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the absence of information about soil quality and the types of crops grown, our results
are effectively averaged over across these characteristics. We have partially addressed
this issue by restricting the analysis to the agro-climatically similar semi-arid states of
India and allowing for state fixed effects so as to capture some of this heterogeneity. Yet
it is possible that credit proves more or less useful for certain combinations of soil and
cropping patterns, even if at an average level the net effect is statistically insignificant.
Bearing in mind these limitations, our findings are nonetheless consistent with recent
literature on the stagnation of agricultural incomes in India (Vakulabharanam and Moti-
ram, 2011; Reddy and Mishra, 2009). This literature argues that alongside other factors
and inputs, credit can support higher productivity and incomes, but that it can also
lead to unmanageable levels of debt after which incomes can stagnate or even decline if
households sell assets to pay off debts if other agricultural production is not profitable
as a whole. The other components needed for this include risk mitigation mechanisms,
seed, fertilizer and pesticide technology, and farmers’ skills and expertise (Sriram, 2007).
Our results then support this mixed view of agricultural credit in a major developing
country, suggesting that the focus of agricultural policy ought to be broader and one that
emphasises other inputs beyond credit.
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Appendices
A Assets index
The main question this paper seeks to answer is “Do farmers benefit from access to agri-
cultural loans?”. In addition to studying investments in farm enterprise, the ‘benefit’ we
are seeking to measure changes in refers to economic status and the linked notion of per-
manent income, neither of which are easy to define or directly observable. Further, since
it is also difficult to directly measure incomes in rural contexts in developing countries
such as India, surveys typically gather information about household expenditure and as-
set ownership as proxies for economic status. Of the two, asset ownership is generally
considered superior, being less prone to measurement errors and less sensitive to price
differences across regions.
Information about asset ownership can be converted to a single-dimensional index by as-
signing weights to each asset category. Filmer & Pritchett (2001) suggest what is now a
popular approach to estimating the weights, using principal components analysis (PCA).
PCA calculates the weights which will yield linear combinations with the maximum vari-
ance, and proceeds by calculating the eigenvectors and eigenvalues for the correlation
matrix (of asset vectors). This approach ensures that asset categories with larger varia-
tion across the sample receive higher weights, and vice-versa. However, as Kolenikov &
Angeles (2009) argue, PCA works best with normally-distributed continuous variables,
whereas asset ownership is typically in terms of non-negative discrete numbers. Therefore,
they instead suggest using polychoric PCA.
Polychoric PCA assumes that the observed discrete variables are in fact discretised ver-
sions of unobserved normally-distributed variables. The correlations between respective
asset categories are then calculated as the maximum-likelihood estimates of the correla-
35
tion between these unobserved variables, and the PCA is performed on the correlation
matrix derived using maximum-likelihood. Using simulation and data from Bangladesh,
Kolenikov & Angeles (2009) demonstrate that polychoric PCA usually helps explain a
greater proportion of variance in the original data compared to ordinary PCA.
Our data are cardinal, in that the survey records the number of units of each category
of asset that a household owns in June 2002 and then on the second survey visit. The
aim is to convert this information into a ranking of the households, to be able to examine
changes in households’ ranks between these two dates. We use data on the following
assets:
1. beds
2. steel / wooden almirah / dressing table
3. pressure cooker/ household utensils
4. electric fan, clock/ watch, water filter / electric iron/ sewing machine
5. stoves
6. radio, record player/tape recorder/stereo/ musical instruments for household use
7. television, VCR/VCP/VCD, DVD Player, home theatre, multimedia PC
8. refrigerator/ air cooler/ air conditioner/ washing machine
The estimation is carried out with the Stata package polychoric written by Kolenikov
(2009). Given that the maximum likelihood estimation of polychoric correlation is com-
putationally intensive, the programme treats variables with more than 10 categories as
being Normally-distributed. The first four variables in the above list are thus treated as
continuous. Pair-wise correlations amongst them are calculated as regular (Pearson) cor-
relations. Correlations between one of them and one of the (<10 category) variables are
polyserial, with one variable treated as Normal and the other as the discretised version
of an unobserved Normally-distributed variable.
Panel (a) in table 9 shows the matrix of polychoric correlations between respective asset
36
categories for the June 2002 data, and panel (a) in table 10 shows the corresponding
eigenvalues estimated using PCA. Both bottom panels (b) in tables 9 and 10 show the
corresponding statistics for the assets owned by the household as on the second survey
visit. Table 10 shows that nearly half the total variation in the assets-related variables is
captured by the first (polychoric) principal component score for both sets of data.
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Table 10: Eigenvalues for correlation matrices in table 9
a) For June 2002 assets data
Component Eigenvalues Proportion Cumulative
explained proportion
1 3.523 0.440 0.440
2 1.022 0.128 0.568
3 0.881 0.110 0.678
4 0.782 0.098 0.776
5 0.700 0.087 0.864
6 0.467 0.058 0.922
7 0.370 0.046 0.968
8 0.255 0.032 1.000
b) For assets data on the second survey visit
Component Eigenvalues Proportion Cumulative
explained proportion
1 3.565 0.446 0.446
2 1.021 0.128 0.573
3 0.854 0.107 0.680
4 0.739 0.092 0.772
5 0.695 0.089 0.859
6 0.466 0.058 0.918
7 0.384 0.048 0.966
8 0.275 0.034 1.000
39
B Farm machinery index
Similarly, we also use polychoric PCA to calculate an index of farm machinery owned by
the household as of June 2002, taking into account the following categories of machinery
and tools:
1. sickle, axe, spade & chopper
2. plough (wooden or iron)
3. harrow, seed-drill, sprayer & duster, chaff-cutter
4. power tiller
5. tractor (excluding trolly)
6. thresher
7. pumps (electric)
8. pumps (other)
Table 11 shows the matrix of polychoric correlations between respective farm machinery
categories, and table 12 shows the corresponding eigenvalues estimated using PCA. Table
12 shows that the first (polychoric) principal component score captures 37% of the total
variation in these data.
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Table 12: Eigenvalues for correlation matrix in table 11
Component Eigenvalues Proportion Cumulative
explained proportion
1 2.962 0.370 0.370
2 1.302 0.163 0.533
3 0.979 0.122 0.655
4 0.836 0.104 0.760
5 0.721 0.090 0.850
6 0.523 0.065 0.915
7 0.417 0.052 0.967
8 0.261 0.033 1.000
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C Households with existing bank loans
In this section we present a separate set of results for the sample of households who
already had agricultural bank loans as on June 2002. There are 998 such households in
the sample. The respective definitions of treatment status (Tassets, Tinvest) correspond to
additional new loans being taken, and these definitions and the corresponding outcomes
we examine are summarised in table 13. Table 14 presents summary statistics for various
household characteristics for the overall sample and by treatment status.
Table 13: Outcomes and definition of treatment
Outcome Treatment definition
Index of consumer durable assets Tassets=1 iff household obtained
owned by household as on date a new agricultural loan
of second survey visit during July 2002 - July 2003
Binary indicator for investments Tinvest=1 iff households obtained
in farm enterprise made a new agricultural loan
by the household during during July 2002 -December 2002
January 2003 -June 2003
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Table 15 presents the regression results for probit models used to estimate the propensity
score. There are two probit regressions corresponding to the two definitions of treatment
status. Similar to the results in the main text, the signs of most variables are as expected,
even though there are fewer statistically significant variables possibly owing to the smaller
sample size. We use these estimated coefficients to predict the respective propensity scores
for the two treatments. Figure 4 shows the distributions of these estimated propensity
scores, and shows that there is substantial overlap in the distribution for treatment and
control groups.
Table 15: Estimation of propensity score for sample of households with existing agricul-
tural loans in June 2002
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Variable Tassets Tinvest
(log) Land area owned 0.0209 (0.101) 0.101 (0.119)
(log) Value of land owned 0.297∗∗∗ (0.0977) 0.281∗∗ (0.110)
Assets index June 2002 0.0857 (0.0592) 0.0468 (0.0648)
Farm machinery index June 2002 -0.132 (0.111) -0.0731 (0.123)
(log) Household monthly per capita expenditure -0.145 (0.210) -0.0282 (0.237)
Residential area owned 0.767 (1.530) 1.801 (1.465)
Years of education household head -0.0173 (0.0133) -0.0131 (0.0153)
Age of household head -0.00927 (0.00744) -0.0201∗∗ (0.00894)
Male household head 0.319 (0.389) 0.110 (0.423)
Household has married male child 0.421∗∗ (0.189) 0.339 (0.214)
Household proportion of children 0.124 (0.519) 0.402 (0.623)
Household proportion of adult males -0.609 (0.562) -0.0185 (0.640)
Household proportion of adult females 0.184 (0.542) 1.008 (0.655)
Household size -0.00650 (0.0304) 0.0165 (0.0330)
Household caste group
Scheduled Tribe base base
Scheduled Caste -0.157 (0.314) 0.0622 (0.337)
Other backward classes 0.110 (0.234) 0.0352 (0.263)
Others 0.0824 (0.248) -0.0603 (0.281)
State
Andhra Pradesh base base
Karnataka -0.297 (0.257) -0.637∗∗ (0.296)
Madhya Pradesh -0.270 (0.221) -0.382 (0.236)
Maharashtra -0.542∗∗ (0.214) -0.868∗∗∗ (0.244)
Tamil Nadu -0.0621 (0.288) -0.149 (0.313)
Constant -3.821∗∗ (1.703) -4.187∗∗ (1.925)
Number of observations 998 998
Log likelihood -228.2 -169.5
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 17 summarises the degree of balance that results following different matching al-
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Figure 4: Distribution of propensity scores by treatment status
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Table 16: Treatment effects for assets and farm investment
θ Standard p-value
error
Assets index -0.0741 0.0664 0.2651
Farm investments 0.0070 0.0175 0.6894
gorithms. As in the main text, kernel matching performs worse than nearest neighbour
matching in both cases. Panel (a) of the table shows that balance generally improves as
the number of neighbours matched on increases. The exception to this is the household
head’s years of education, for which balance is actually worse across all matched samples
relative to the unmatched samples. This is likely a result of the small sample size on which
matching is being undertaken. Notwithstanding, we select nearest neighbour matching
with n=10 as the best matching algorithm corresponding to the Tassets treatment.
Panel (b) of table 17 does not show as clear a pattern as panel (a). Matching on 3 nearest
neighbours results in a reduction in imbalance of atleast 85% across all covariates, and
thus we select this as the best matching algorithm corresponding to the Tinvest treatment.
Table 16 shows the treatment effect estimates that result from the preceding choices of
matching algorithm. Similar to the treatment effects for households without existing
agricultural loans (in the main text), these effects are statistically (very) insignificant,
while the sign of the treatment effect for the assets outcome is negative and that for farm
investment is positive.
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